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STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF HUMAN SERVICES, and UTAH 
STATE DEVELOPMENT CENTER, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
CASE NO. 20030106-CA 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION 
Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act (the "Immunity Act"), alleging that defendants were negligent in failing to 
supervise one of their patients who became violent and struck plaintiff Tracy Wagner (R. 
5-1). The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Utah R. Civ. P. 12 
(b)(6), based on immunity for injuries arising out of assault or battery pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (R. 72-71, 75-73). Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal 
from the trial court's order (R. 86). This Court has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal 
under transfer from the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(2002). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
Contrary to plaintiffs' statement that there are two issues presented, there is only 
one issue for this Court to address on this appeal. That issue is stated as follows: 
Did the district court correctly dismiss plaintiffs' complaint, based on statutory 
immunity for liability arising out of an assault or battery, where the assault or 
battery was committed by a mentally incompetent person? 
Defendants raised this issue in their motion to dismiss (hereafter the "Motion", 
R. 25-24) and their supporting memorandum (R. 38-26), as well as in their reply 
memorandum (R. 61-51). The district court granted defendants' Motion on this point 
(R. 72-71). 
Plaintiffs also raise the issue of whether their complaint properly stated a claim for 
relief, and argue that the trial court should not have dismissed the case under Rule 
12(b)(6). In doing so, plaintiffs mis-perceive the State's Motion. The State assumes, for 
purposes of its Motion, that the plaintiffs' complaint did properly state a claim of 
negligent supervision. Its Motion is based solely on the fact that the four corners of 
plaintiffs' complaint reflect that plaintiffs' injuries arose out of an assault or battery, 
thereby giving rise to governmental immunity pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2). 
That is the only issue that needs to be addressed on this appeal. 
Standard of Review: 
"Because the propriety of a dismissal under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
is a question of law, we give the trial court's ruling no deference and review it under a 
correctness standard. In our review of a decision dismissing a case under Rule 12(b)(6) 
2 
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we accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff" Snow 
Flower Homeowners Ass yn v. Snow Flower, Ltd., 2001 UT App 207, H 7, 31 P3d 576 
(citations omitted). See also Ho v. Jim's Enters., Inc., 2001 UT 63, % 6, 29 P.3d 633. 
Moreover, whether or not plaintiffs' claim falls within the assault or battery 
exception to the general waiver of governmental immunity for negligence claims "is a 
question of law to be reviewed for correctness." Malcolm v. State, 878 P.2d 1144, 1146 
(Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) provides as follows: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope 
of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results 
from: 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, 
intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference 
with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil 
rightsf.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
On July 25, 2002, plaintiffs filed a complaint in this action (R. 5-1). The 
complaint set forth a claim for relief based on the alleged negligence of the Utah State 
Development Center ("USDC") in failing "to properly supervise the activity of" a 
3 
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mentally incompetent patient who was in its care (R. 4, *J 11). Tracy Wagner asserted a 
claim for damages suffered when she was attacked by the patient (R. 3-2); her husband, 
Robert Wagner, asserted a claim for loss of consortium (R. 2, ^ 21). 
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the 
ground that, based on the allegations of the complaint, plaintiffs' injuries arose out of an 
assault or battery, thereby entitling the defendants to immunity, as a matter of law, under 
the assault or battery exception to the waiver of immunity for negligence claims pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (R. 25-24, 38-26). Plaintiffs filed a responsive 
memorandum opposing the Motion (R. 50-39). Defendants then filed a reply 
memorandum (R. 61-51) and submitted the Motion for decision (R. 64-63). 
A hearing on the Motion was held on November 14, 2002 (R. 69). On December 
20, 2002, the trial court issued a Ruling granting the Motion (R. 72-71). The trial court 
held that the deliberate acts of the USDC patient constituted an assault or battery, and 
thus that plaintiffs' "action is barred by the Governmental Immunity Act" (R. 71). An 
Order of Dismissal was filed on January 10, 2003 (R. 75-73). Plaintiffs filed a timely 
Notice of Appeal on January 28, 2003 (R. 86). 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
On October 16, 2001, plaintiff Tracy Wagner was attacked by a patient of the 
USDC while shopping at the K-Mart store in American Fork, Utah (R. 4, % 8). Plaintiff 
described this attack in her Complaint as follows: 
4 
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Plaintiff Tracy D. Wagner was doing business at the K-Mart store located at 175 
North West State Road in American Fork, Utah on October 16, 2001, at 
approximately 12:30 p.m., and was standing in line with others at the customer 
service desk near the front of the store. Unknown to Tracy D. Wagner, a patient of 
the Utah State Development Center was in the store somewhere behind her. The 
patient became violent, took Tracy D. Wagner by the head and hair, and threw her 
to the ground and otherwise acted in such a way as to cause serious bodily injury 
to her, 
R. 4, TJ 8 (emphasis added). 
The patient, Sam Giese, was a 28-year-old, profoundly mentally retarded man (R. 
4, % 10; 49). * At the time, Mr. Giese was in the custody of the USDC and was taken on a 
trip to the K-Mart as part of his treatment; employees of the USDC were present in the K-
Mart with Mr. Giese (R. 3, ^  15). Plaintiffs assert claims of negligence by USDC, all of 
which arise out of the attack by Mr. Giese upon Tracy Wagner. (R. 5-1). 
The USDC operates under the Utah Department of Human Services, Division of 
Services for People with Disabilities. See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-5-102 (1997). The 
Department of Human Services is an agency of the State of Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 
62A-1-101, et. seq. (1997). All defendants are governmental entities (R. 49). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case arises out of an attack upon plaintiff Tracy Wagner, whereby she was 
taken by the hair and thrown to the ground. Because that attack constituted an assault or 
1
 Although defendants admit Mr. Giese's mental incompetence, they disagree with 
plaintiffs' assertion in their "Statement of Facts" that due to this mental deficiency, "Mr. 
Giese lacked sufficient understanding or capacity to be responsible, as a matter of law, for 
breaching any standard of care relating to any negligent or intentional tort." Aplt. Br. at 
3-4. That is not a fact, and is not a correct statement of the law as discussed infra. 
5 
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battery, defendants, all of whom are governmental entities, are immune from suit pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2). 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that if the attack had been committed by a mentally 
competent person, their claims would be barred by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2). 
However, plaintiffs argue that because the attack in this case was committed by a 
mentally retarded man, § 63-30-10(2) does not apply - purportedly because the assailant 
lacked the requisite intent to commit an assault or battery. In making this argument, 
however, plaintiffs have ignored dispositive authority on this very issue. Both this Court 
(in Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah App. 1994)) and the Utah Supreme 
Court (in Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993)) have expressly upheld 
immunity in cases involving assaults, even though they were committed by persons who 
were mentally deficient. Plaintiffs' argument is neither novel nor persuasive and should 
be rejected. 
In support of their argument that mentally incompetent persons cannot form the 
requisite intent to commit an assault or battery under the Immunity Act, plaintiffs have 
misstated the applicable intent standard. The trial court found the attack was a deliberate 
one, i.e., done with the intent to cause contact with the plaintiff That is the standard set 
forth in the Restatement (Second) Torts § 21, which was adopted by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 503 (Utah 1996), a case that similarly involved 
assault or battery immunity. Plaintiffs ignore this standard and instead argue that in order 
to constitute an assault or battery, the assailant must have acted with an intent to cause 
6 
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harm. They rely on two cases, both of which pre-date Tiede and neither of which 
involved the issue of assault or battery immunity. 
Plaintiffs' arguments disregard the standard set forth in Tiede, and are inconsistent 
with both the Wright and Higgins decisions. For these reasons, as more fully explained 
below, this case arises out of an assault or battery entitling the defendants to 
governmental immunity. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court's order 
of dismissal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THE STATE IMMUNE 
FROM LIABILITY FOR INJURY ARISING OUT OF AN ASSAULT OR 
BATTERY. 
A. Under the Governmental Immunity Act, Assault or Battery Immunity 
Is To Be Broadly Applied. 
In order to bring suit against the State, plaintiffs must show a waiver of immunity 
in the Governmental Immunity Act (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 through -38 (2001), 
hereinafter "the Immunity Act"). The State assumes, for purposes of this Motion, that 
there has been such a waiver of immunity here for plaintiffs' claims of negligence under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (2001).2 Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10, however, sets forth the 
2
 Plaintiffs state, in passing, that the trial court barred plaintiffs' claims because 
they arose out of an intentional tort, "even though the complaint only alleged negligence 
on the part of the State." Aplt. Br. at 4. Under § 63-30-10(2), however, the State is 
immune for any claim for injuries that "arises out of" an assault or battery. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that the phrase "arises out o f is "very broad, general and 
comprehensive" and requires "only that there be some causal relationship" between the 
plaintiffs injury and the assault or battery. Taylor v. Ogden City School Dist., 927 P.2d 
7 
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circumstances under which there are exceptions to that waiver (i.e., under which the State 
retains its immunity), including the circumstance where plaintiffs' claims for injury arise 
out of an assault or battery. In relevant part, that statute provides as follows: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope 
of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results 
from: 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, 
intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference 
with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil 
rightsf.] 
Utah Code Ann., § 63-30-10(2) (2001) (emphasis added). 
The courts of this state have consistently granted immunity to governmental 
entities for injuries that arise out of an assault or battery. See Taylor, 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 
1996) (barring a claim against a school district by a child pushed into a window by 
another student while at school); Tiede, 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996) (barring claims against 
the State from an action brought by the family members of two women who were shot 
and killed by walkaways from a state-owned halfway house); Malcolm v. State, 878 P.2d 
1144 (Utah 1994) (barring a claim brought by a sexual assault victim against the State for 
having paroled the assailant); S.K v. State, 865 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993) (barring claims 
against the State School for the Deaf and Blind for hiring a cab driver who molested a 
student); Higgins, 855 P.2d 231 (barring a claim by a ten-year-old girl who was stabbed 
159, 163 (Utah 1996). Thus, any claim of negligence, including a claim for negligent 
supervision, is barred based on Mr. Giese's attack upon Tracy Wagner. 
8 
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by a Salt Lake County Mental Health mental patient); Petersen v. Davis County School 
District, 855 P.2d 241 (Utah 1993) (barring a claim by a spectator at a basketball game 
arising out of a fight with the game announcer); Ledfors v. Emery County School 
District, 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993) (barring a claim against a school district by a student 
who was beaten by two others while in school); Wright, 876 P.2d 380 (barring a claim by 
a student who was struck by a University employee). | 
In broadly upholding immunity in cases that arise out of assault or battery, the 
Utah Supreme Court has stated that the status and attributes of the assailant are irrelevant 
to determining whether or not to apply § 63-30-10(2): "Because it is the negligence of 
the governmental employee upon which any claim of liability must rest, it would make no 
sense to engraft upon that waiver a limitation based upon the status of the assailant." 
Higgins, 855 P.2d at 240. Accordingly, it makes no difference whether the assailant is a 
governmental employee. Id. See also Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163-64; S.H., 865 P.2d at 
1364-65. Similarly, it makes no difference whether the assailant is mentally competent. 
See Wright, Higgins, supra. 
B. Immunity Under Section 63-30-10(2) Applies Even Where an Assault is 
Committed by a Mentally Incompetent Person. 
Two cases that are directly on point have expressly upheld governmental immunity 
despite the mental deficiency of the assailant. In Wright v. University of Utah, this Court 
upheld assault or battery immunity despite the assailant's "questionable mental 
condition/' Wright, 876 P.2d at 384. Plaintiffs try to distinguish Wright by pointing out 
9 
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that the Court, in the first instance, upheld assault or battery immunity because plaintiffs 
complaint alleged (and thus admitted) that an assault took place. While that is true, the 
Court then went on to deny the plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint to reflect 
the questionable mental state of the assailant because such an amendment "would be a 
fruitless, albeit creative, attempt to circumvent the clear language of section 63-30-10." 
M a t 386. The Court held: 
Nothing in the [Immunity] Act or in our case law indicates that the distinction 
[plaintiff] champions was contemplated by the legislature to determine whether 
immunity exists under section 63-30-10(2). The focus is on the result, not the 
circumstances leading thereto. 
Id. at 387. The Court also supported its decision with similar cases (involving assaults 
committed by insane individuals) decided under analogous sections of the Federal Tort 
Claims Act. M a t 386-87. 
Plaintiffs argue that the Court's ruling in Wright was dicta because the Court did 
not need to reach this issue. That, however, is not the case; any time a court addresses a 
motion to amend, it needs to determine whether the proposed amendment is "legally 
insufficient." Wright, 876 P.2d at 387; Otsuka Elec's. (USA, Inc.) v. Imaging Specialists, 
Inc., 937 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Thus, the proposed amended complaint 
was properly before the Court in Wright, and the Court's reason for rejecting it - because 
it would still be deficient due to the immunity afforded under § 63-30-10(2) - is 
persuasive legal precedent. 
10 
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Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court unanimously reached the same conclusion in 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, which plaintiffs failed to address in their brief. There, a ten-
year old girl was stabbed by a patient of Salt Lake County Mental Health. The patient 
claimed that she "heard voices telling her to stab someone" which led to the stabbing. 
Higgins, 855 P.2d at 234. The court applied assault or battery immunity to bar plaintiffs 
claims for injuries arising out of the stabbing, even though the assailant was found "guilty 
and mentally ill" of charges stemming from the attack (id.) and "had been diagnosed as a 
paranoid schizophrenic with organic brain dysfunction and marginal intelligence." Id. at 
233. 
The Supreme Court, again unanimously, reiterated its holding from Higgins the 
following year in Malcolm v. State. There, the State was alleged to have failed to protect 
the plaintiff from a parolee who sexually assaulted her after he was released. Although 
that case did not involve a mentally deficient assailant, the court referenced the Higgins 
decision, and said: 
We held [in Higgins] that the defendants were immune from suit under the assault-
and-battery exception in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2). We did so despite the fact 
that the patient was found (i guilty and mentally ill" of attempted criminal homicide 
Malcolm, 878 P.2d at 1147 (emphasis added). In other words, the mental status of the 
assailant is not relevant to an analysis under § 63-30-10(2). 
11 
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Thus, based on Wright and Higgins, the law in this State is well-settled: 
governmental entities are immune from claims for injuries that arise from assaults or 
batteries, even when committed by mentally incompetent persons. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD FOR 
DETERMINING INTENT TO COMMIT AN ASSAULT OR BATTERY 
UNDER THE IMMUNITY ACT. 
A. The Trial Court Relied on the Correct Standard of Intent. 
In its decision, the trial court held that the attack at issue was a deliberate, rather 
than accidental, act and thus constituted an assault or battery under the Immunity Act (R. 
71). The trial court implicitly determined that the intent required to constitute an assault 
or battery was the intent to cause contact with another, not the more rigorous standard 
advocated by plaintiffs, i.e., the intent to cause harm. This is the standard set forth by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Tiede v. State, which, like this case, involved the application of 
assault or battery immunity. In Tiede, the assailants murdered their victims, and the Court 
held that those attacks fell within the common law definitions of "assault" and "battery." 
Tiede, 915 P.2d at 502-03. The Supreme Court adopted the standard set forth in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 21 (1965), under which the pivotal issue is whether the 
actor "intend[ed] to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other." 
Id. at 503, n. 3 (emphasis added). In other words, under Tiede, all that is required to 
commit the intentional tort of assault or battery is the intent to make contact with another, 
not the intent to harm another. 
12 
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This standard distinguishes between contacts that are deliberate (which rise to the 
level of an intentional tort of assault or battery) and those that are accidental (which rise 
only to the level of negligence.) If the contact was intended, it matters not whether the 
assailant had an intent to cause harm or an ability to comprehend whether harm would 
result. 
In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Giese "became violent, took Tracy D. 
Wagner by the head and hair, and threw her to the ground and otherwise acted in such a 
way as to cause serious bodily injury to her." (R. 4, K 8.) The plain meaning of the 
complaint reflects an unmistakable intent by Mr. Giese to make physical contact with Ms. 
Wagner. Based on the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint, the attack by Sam Giese met 
the definition of an "assault or battery" recognized under the Restatement, Tiede, and § 
63-30-10(2).3 
B. Plaintiffs Rely on an Incorrect Intent Standard. 
Appellants include the Tiede case in the section of their brief entitled 
"Determinative Law," acknowledging that it is "key" for defining the "intent requirement 
for a civil assault." Aplt. Br. at 2. Yet, appellants merely pay Tiede lip service and 
ignore its teaching that the intent required is the intent to cause contact. Instead, 
3
 In their brief, plaintiffs' argue, for the first time, that Mr. Giese's actions were 
"something more akin to a seizure or involuntary action." Aplt. Br. at 10-11. Such a 
conclusion, however, is not a tenable interpretation of the event as stated in the plaintiffs' 
complaint. Moreover, that contention was never raised below, and should therefore be 
disregarded. Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 
889 P.2d 445, 460, n. 19 (Utah App. 1994). 
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appellants ask this court to apply a criminal standard requiring an intent to harm. 
Actually, plaintiffs argue that the State must "show that Mr. Giese acted with malice or 
with knowledge that he was acting illegally/' Aplt. Br. at 10. Such a standard, however, 
is not supported by Tiede or the Restatement, and does not apply here. 
In arguing for this different standard, plaintiffs rely on two cases - both of which 
predate Tiede, and neither of which involved the Immunity Act. In Matheson v. Pearson, 
619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980), a student threw a tootsie pop from a second story window and 
hit a school maintenance man in the head. Two years later, plaintiff sued asserting a 
negligence theory. Defendant obtained summary judgment because the defendants' 
actions were deemed intentional torts, subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Id. at 
322. The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the statute of limitations would not 
bar plaintiffs claims because defendants' actions may have constituted "reckless 
misconduct" negligence not subject to the one-year statute. Id. at 323. In reversing, the 
Matheson court principally relied on old case law from other jurisdictions,4 and never 
addressed the Restatement section later adopted by the Court in Tiede. In any event, 
Matheson was decided sixteen years before Tiede, and did not involve a determination 
under section 63-20-10(2). It does not provide authority to stray from the Tiede standard. 
4
 Matheson relies heavily on a 1941 California case in distinguishing between a 
person who acts negligently and "a person guilty of willful misconduct, such as assault 
and battery, who intends to cause harm." Id. at 322. In doing so, the Matheson court 
appears to have confused two different standards - intentional tort and willful misconduct 
- which might explain Matheson's inconsistency with the Restatement and Tiede. 
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In the other case cited by plaintiffs, Doe v. Doe, 878 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1994), 
the plaintiff sued the defendant for a sexual assault and asserted a claim of negligence. 
Id. at 1162. Defendant obtained a dismissal on the ground that the actions were 
intentional and not negligent. The Court reversed and remanded to determine whether the 
actions constituted reckless misconduct. Id. at 1163. There, however, the Court relied 
almost exclusively on the Matheson decision, and thus recited the same erroneous legal 
standard set forth by Matheson. In fact, on the day after the Court issued its decision in 
Doe, it issued a decision in D.D.Z. v. Molerway Freight Lines, Inc., 880 P.2d 1 (Utah 
App. 1994), in which the Court set forth the elements of civil assault and battery claims 
and stated that the intent requirement was whether the defendant "acted, intending to 
cause harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff." Id. at 3 (emphasis added). This is 
the standard recognized two years later in Tiede. 
None of plaintiffs' cases involve a determination of the level of intent required to 
constitute an assault or battery under § 63-30-10(2). On the other hand, Tiede does 
involve such a determination and expressly requires only an intent to make contact. 
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court's ruling will result in cases that arise out of 
purely negligent conduct being "swallowed up in the immunity statute." Aplt. Br. at 17. 
They set forth an analogy where a runner accidentally falls onto another while running 
around a track, causing injury. In fact, the trial court recognized the precise distinction 
which would guard against such an overly broad impact of assault or battery immunity -
the distinction between accidental and deliberate contact. Under this standard, a claim 
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that arises due to a runner who accidentally falls onto another does not arise out of an 
assault or battery because there was no intent to make contact. 
In the present case, however, there was not unintentional contact. Mr. Giese 
grabbed Tracy Wagner by the hair and threw her to the ground (R. 4, ]^ 8). This was no 
accident; the contact was deliberate. As such, the intent element has been met. 
C. Utah Statutory Law Supports the State's Position. 
Plaintiffs argue that this Court should follow the plain language of the statute, and 
that by using the terms assault and battery the legislature "quite plainly referr[ed] to either 
an intentional tort or a specific criminal act." Aplt. Br. at 16 (emphasis added). In other 
words, plaintiffs assert that the terms "assault" and "battery" are synonymous in both the 
civil and criminal context, and so, just as with criminal assault, there must be some mens 
rea requirement in order to commit a civil assault. 
Plaintiffs, however, are wrong. The-Criminal Code and the Immunity Act treat the 
issue of mental state very differently. The Utah Criminal Code defines the elements of 
assault at Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1999 & Supp. 2002).5 It then contains a separate 
provision that provides "[i]t is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or ordinance 
that the defendants, as a result of mental illness, lacked the mental state required as an 
element of the offense charged." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(l)(a) (1999). The 
5
 The Utah Criminal Code defines assault differently from the way in which the 
supreme court defined it in the Tiede case. This result is consistent with the notion that 
intentional torts and crimes are different legal concepts, treated differently by the courts. 
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Immunity Act, on the other hand, does not contain a provision exempting those with a 
questionable mental state from an assault or battery analysis. 
Thus, contrary to the plaintiffs' argument, the legislature did intend to treat 
criminal assaults under the Criminal Code (where there is an exception for an impaired 
mental state) different from civil assaults under the Immunity Act (where mental state 
does not come into play). It would be inappropriate to rely on a provision of the Criminal 
Code to interpret a provision of a the Immunity Act, which arises out of different 
legislation and serves an entirely different purpose. See Moreno v. Jordan Sch. Dist., 926 
P.2d 886, 889 (Utah 1996) ("[o]ne of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is 
that the courts will look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by 
the entire context and subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject.") (Citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
D. Foreign Case Law Likewise Supports the State's Position, 
1. Analogous federal law supports the State's position. 
In Wright, this Court relied on analogous cases decided under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act ("FTCA"), which has an exception (28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994)) similar to 
§ 63-30-10(2) of the Immunity Act, which grants immunity for injuries arising out of 
assaults or batteries. 
In Miele v. United States, 800 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1986), a plaintiff brought suit under 
the FTCA for injuries that arose out of an assault and battery committed by a person who 
was adjudicated to be insane. Despite plaintiffs argument that the assailant's mental 
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capacity prevented him from being "capable of forming the intent necessary to commit an 
assault/' (id. at 52) the court upheld immunity in that case and stated: "since [the < 
assailant] could have been liable for civil assault regardless of his sanity his assault and 
battery perpetrated against the infant plaintiff in this case was an intentional tort. 
i 
Therefore the § 2680(h) exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity applies." Id. at 
53. See also Spaulding v. United States, 621 F.Supp. 1150, 1154 (D. Me. 1985) ("a party 
presenting a claim arising out of an assault and battery may not avoid the subsection 
2680(h) statutory exclusion for intentional torts by establishing that the assailant lacked 
the mental capacity to form the requisite intent, even where, as here, the assailant was 
found not guilty of the criminal assault charge by reason of insanity"). 
These FTCA cases further support the State's position. 
2. Plaintiffs case law is distinguishable. 
Despite the clear statement of the law in Tiede, plaintiffs cite four cases from other 
jurisdictions, purportedly to demonstrate that an intentional tort cannot been committed 
by a mentally deficient individual. Obviously, none of those cases address the Immunity 
Act, and so all are irrelevant to this appeal. Moreover, these cases do not support the 
plaintiffs' position. 
In Edwards v. Stills, 984 S.W.2d 366 (Ark. 1998) and Goffv. Taylor, 708 S.W.2d 
113 (Ky. App. 1986), the issue was whether mentally incompetent persons could be held 
liable for punitive damages, based on the standard for punitive damages in their 
respective states. Like the case wrongly relied upon in Matheson, such a determination 
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involved a willful misconduct standan1 M-*I whether an intentional tort was committed 
undei I "lillli I,IV, I Joieovei , in /W/UW/Y/.S, despite a psychotic disorder, the court af turned 
IIK Iury's verdict that defendant con in ntted intentional lent"., and held the assailanl habit; 
fof :fio injui ics he caused, as well as pinlitive damages. 984 So. 2d at 390. In Gqffl tlle 
pi)»-n simiuiiiv Held that despite plaintiff's insanity, he committed intentional torts when 
I ne si lot ai id killed 1 lis ^ ' ictii i i ' 708 S W 2d at II II \ ' 1 1 lese citatioi is si lppoi t tl le State 's 
position that Sam Giese's deficiency does not preclude him from ha\ HL > i 
intentional tort. 
' 1 1 ic tv ':,o c ases fi oi i 11 'loi ida' s intermediate court^ ua A I>\ plaintiffs are likewise 
unavailing. In one, Kaczer v. Man * / . ' n 
was held liable for assaulting the plaintiff, an Jiiio^om .ictiin. In the other, Amcei v. 
Gant, 580 So,2d 2 73 (1 ; la Vpp 1991), a mental institution attendant was precluded from 
-Aiww • n, •. . j . ..
 :. ;,, ,v tN -|)i:r -|U. plaintiff 'in 
Kaczer was "an innocent member of the public" while Uie pLm- -•- : • •. . .< >- i 
attendant, capable of protecting himself Anicet, 580 So.2d at 275-76. As applied lu this 
ease, b a n War-ntt lalh mid «hc first category. Thus, even under this line of cases, Sam. 
Giese, despite his mental state, would be deemed hi hir e e< innnttnf an intenlu »nal I it. 
Plaintiffs cite to these cases in support of a public policy argument regarding the 
Hat ility of i i lei itall/y i;i icompetent persons. 'I ti.it argument, however, misses the point of 
the State's argument 1 IK* Slate does not ai^ta thai cul.iin \ l.iims against eillu r a 
mentally incompetent person, or those providing supervision, are bai ret 11 IT id< i < ; :oi i ri i i o n 
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law tort principles. Rather, the State's Motion was based on governmental immunity. 
The State legislature saw fit to protect the State's treasury by retaining its sovereign < 
immunity in limited circumstances, such as this, where a plaintiffs injuries arise out of an 
assault. The policy underlying this statute has been set by the legislature. As the Utah 
Supreme Court stated in Tiede "we are bound by the legislature's policy decisions and are 
constrained by the immunity act to deny recovery against the State." Tiede, 915 P.2d at 
504. 
The district court's ruling embraced the correct legal standard regarding the level 
of intent required to commit an assault or battery under the Immunity Act. Accordingly, 
the district court properly held that this case arose out of an assault or battery, and that 
plaintiffs' claims are therefore barred. As the plaintiffs have provided no reason to 
disturb the district court's decision, this Court should affirm the district court's order of 
dismissal. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, defendants respectfully request the Court to affirm the decision 
of the district court upholding governmental immunity for the defendants and dismissing 
this case with prejudice. 
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REQUEST RE ORAL ARGUMENT 
Although defendants believe the dispositive issue in this case has been 
authoritatively decided, they request oral argument for the sole purpose of clarifying the 
applicable immunity standard. 
Dated this / / ~ day of July, 2003. 
B A R M t i . LAWRENCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
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